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ENUMERATION AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES
FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS: THE VIEW FROM 1787/1791

Constitutional designers employ many strategies for securing what they believe are
fundamental rights and vital interests.1 Specifying in the constitutional text the rights and
interests to be protected is a common device. In a constitution that relies solely on enumeration
as a rights protective strategy, whether that constitution protects abortion rights depends on
whether any provision in that constitution is best interpreted as granting women a right to
terminate their pregnancies. Enumerating the powers government officials may exercise is a
second rights protective strategy. Government may not constitutionally ban partial-birth
abortions, although no constitutional provision properly interpreted protects a right to
reproductive choice, when no constitutional provision properly interpreted authorizes
government officials to interfere with reproductive decisions. Structuring government
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institutions is a third rights protective strategy, one that does not rely primarily on enumeration
or interpretation. Government officials do not ban abortion, even when at least some reasonable
persons believe constitutional provisions are best interpreted as permitting legislative
prohibitions, when the constitutional rules for staffing the government and passing laws
consistently provide pro-choice advocates with the power necessary to prevent hostile proposals
from becoming law. Equal protection is a fourth strategy for protecting fundamental rights.
Elected officials are less inclined to ban abortion when they may not constitutionally confine that
prohibition to certain social classes or racial groups.
Contemporary American constitutionalists typically treat enumeration as the primary,
often only, constitutional strategy for protecting fundamental rights. The common
terminological distinction between “enumerated” and “unenumerated” rights implies that rights
not enumerated in the constitutional text are best characterized by virtue of what they are not,
rather than as linked to alternative constitutional strategies for securing fundamental freedoms.
Constitutional debate during the 1970s and 1980s was over whether justices ought to extend the
same degree of protection they offered to the liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights and postCivil War Amendments to other fundamental freedoms not explicitly mentioned in those texts or
in other constitutional provisions. “[T]he most fundamental question we can ask about our
fundamental law,” Thomas Grey declared in 1975, is whether when “reviewing laws for
constitutionality, should our judges confine themselves to determining whether those laws
conflict with norms derived from the written Constitution . . . [o]r may they also enforce
principles of liberty and justice when the normative content of those principles is not to be found
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within the four corners of our founding document?”2
Enumeration presently reigns supreme in the American constitutional universe. Leading
progressive constitutional theorists at the turn of the twenty-first century insist that rights
formerly thought unenumerated are actually enumerated. “The distinction . . . between
enumerated and unenumerated rights,” Ronald Dworkin declares when defending judicial
solicitude for legal abortion, is “another misunderstood semantic device.”3 Dworkin and other
prominent proponents of Roe v. Wade4 maintain justices must strike down bans on abortion only
because reproductive rights are explicitly protected by the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted.5 Grey, who helped coin the term
“non-interpretivism,” agrees with this emphasis on enumeration as the foundation of
constitutional right. He now believes “[i]t is better to treat all approaches to constitutional
adjudication as constrained to the interpretation of the sources of constitutional law, and then to
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argue about what those sources are and how much relative weight they should have.”6
Constitutional analysis that privileges enumeration as the primary constitutional strategy
for protecting fundamental freedoms interprets the constitution of 1787 in light of the
constitution of 1791.7 The original constitution, commentary that celebrates the Bill of Rights
proclaims, was largely limited to delineating the structure and powers of the national
government. That constitution sought to create institutions that would protect against foreign
aggression, suppress internal rebellions, and regulate the national economy, but omitted vital
protections against abusive official behavior. The first ten amendments to the constitution, on
this account, guarantee that the national government will respect certain fundamental freedoms
when securing the above constitutional ends. Contemporary pedagogy entrenches this
distinction between the original and amended constitution by dividing the constitutional universe
into a course on the structure of government, which focuses exclusively on the proper
interpretation of constitutional provisions drafted in 1787, and a course on civil rights and
liberties, which focuses exclusively on the proper interpretation of amendments ratified in 1791,
1865, and 1868.8
This sharp separation between constitutional questions associated with the structure of
government and constitutional questions associated with fundamental freedoms distorts
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constitutional history and practice. The framers of the original constitution failed to specify what
rights the constitution protected because they did not believe enumeration was an effective
strategy for securing fundamental freedoms. Vested property rights and the freedom of speech,
in their view, were better protected by well-designed governing institutions than by paper
guarantees. The more fundamental the right, the less likely that right was enumerated in 1787.
Federalist 10 highlights “the rights of property” and worries that a “religious sect may degenerate
into a political faction. ”9 Nevertheless, the original constitution provides no explicit textual
protections for economic liberty or freedom of conscience. Madison instead insisted that the
constitutional politics of the large republic would provide more secure guarantees for these rights
than a pious textualism.10 Framers who did not fully grasp Madison’s analysis in Federalist 1011
nevertheless endorsed Madison’s more general commitment to institutional design as the best
strategy for preventing tyranny.12
This paper interprets the constitution of 1791 in light of the constitution of 1787.13 The
persons responsible for the original constitution thought they had secured fundamental rights by
a combination of representation, the separation of powers, and the extended republic. The Bill of
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Rights, in their view, was a minor supplement to the strategies previously employed for
preventing abusive government practices. Madison in 1789 did suggest that enumeration might
provide some additional security for the freedom of speech and related concerns. Nevertheless,
his proposed amendments were less a list of fundamental freedoms than an enumeration of those
rights likely to appease moderate anti-Federalists. That many vaguely phrased rights lacked
clear legal meaning was of little concern to their Federalist sponsors, who trusted their cherished
governing institutions to resolve ambiguities justly when controversies arose in the future.
Madison and his political allies refused to accommodate their political rivals only when former
anti-Federalists proposed enumerating a right to instruct representatives, a right Madison thought
destructive of the constitutional politics he believed best secured fundamental freedoms.
Contemporary debates over whether the United States has an unwritten constitution and
whether the judiciary (or any other institution) should protect unenumerated constitutional rights
are rooted in the ways the framers from 1787 to 1791 juxtaposed different strategies for
protecting fundamental freedoms. The Bill of Rights did not include a caveat stating that those
amendments were a “sop” to the Anti-Federalists,14 a minor supplement to more important
institutional protections for fundamental rights, or a somewhat random collection of liberties
spelled out for the sole benefit of persons unaware of how constitutions best protected rights.
Persons reading the constitutional text after 1791 might well conclude that those rights
enumerated were more central to the constitutional order than those omitted. Marbury v.
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Madison,15 or rather the nineteenth century political movements that successfully reinvigorated
the logic of Marbury, further promoted enumeration and judicial power as the only means for
limiting republican government. If, as Madison claimed in 1789, “independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights,”16 and, as a
later Supreme Court justice asserted, “the Constitution is what the judges say it is,”17 then the
conclusion might follow that the constitution protected only those rights enumerated in the text,
rights best protected by the federal judiciary. Such claims were made, however, only after
Americans forgot the constitutional strategies for protecting fundamental rights adopted in 1787
and transformed the partisan strategy adopted in 1789 for appeasing political opponents into the
best constitutional strategy for securing vital freedoms in the present.

I. The View from 1787

Conventional accounts of American constitutional development regard the Bill of Rights
as correcting a defective constitution. Citizens are commonly taught that the persons who
drafted the original constitution forgot to include textual protections for fundamental rights in
their effort to "secure the blessings of liberty." Exhausted by months of “writ[ing] and
rewrit[ing] sections” on “the frame of government,” fatigued by the summer heat, and eager to
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return home, the framers’ “impatience outweighed their judgment” when every state delegation
rejected George Mason’s proposal that the constitution be “prefaced with a Bill of Rights.”18
Subsequent rationalizations that a Bill of Rights was not necessary in a government of
enumerated powers19 were clearly inadequate. As numerous Anti-Federalists pointed out, the
powers enumerated in Article I could easily be interpreted as granting the federal government
unlimited authority. “The clause which vests the power to pass all laws which are proper and
necessary, to carry the powers given into execution,” Brutus complained, “leaves the legislature
at liberty, to do every thing, which in their judgment is best.”20 The Bill of Rights supposedly
cured the original constitution’s failure to provide adequate textual protections for basic rights by
providing legal guarantees that national officials would not violate fundamental freedoms when
pursuing legitimate constitutional ends.
The better view is that the framers in 1787 were committed to protecting fundamental
18
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freedoms, but did not believe enumeration the best constitutional strategy for securing cherished
individual rights. Identifying tyranny with class or partial legislation,21 Federalists designed
governing institutions they believed would enable the best men to gain public office and provide
those distinguished representatives with incentives to secure the public welfare. Madison and his
political allies were convinced that government abuses and majority tyranny would most likely
be prevented by processes for staffing the government that privileged the selection of particularly
wise and virtuous candidates, and by processes for making laws that privileged policies aimed at
the common good rather than the benefit of particular classes or individuals. The large republic,
Federalist 10 proclaimed, would yield a leadership class “whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”22 Federalist 51 explained why the
constitutional separation of powers would enable “the private interest of every individual” to be
“a sentinel over the public rights.”23 Structural considerations trumped parchment barriers in
1787. If governing institutions were designed correctly, the framers believed, enumerating
individual rights was unnecessary. If governing institutions were designed poorly, enumerating
individual rights was useless.
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A. Protecting Rights in 178724

The persons responsible for drafting the constitution of 1787 were far more concerned
with constitutional politics than constitutional law. They sought government institutions that
privileged certain outcomes and were less interested in formulating textual definitions of
government powers and individual rights. Madison famously proposed "republican remed[ies]
for the diseases most incident to republican government."25 The original constitution did not
include a Bill of Rights because Madison and other prominent framers doubted the efficacy of
legal limitations on government power. On matters as diverse as religious freedom and slavery,
the framers consistently sought to establish a political process that would secure certain
fundamental rights and interests, scorning the enumeration strategy they would later adopt in
1791.
Federalists in 1787 regarded legal restrictions on federal power as dangerous,
inappropriate and useless. In their view, “a written declaration of rights” was “unnecessary in
theory and ineffectual in practice.”26 Madison thought “the adoption of a federal bill of rights”
was “an irrelevant antidote to the real dangers that republican politics would generate."27
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Government officials committed to the public good sometimes faced irresistible pressures to
ignore textual limits on their powers. "[I]t is in vain," Federalist 41 asserted, "to oppose
constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation."28 Past experience demonstrated that
clear constitutional guidelines did not restrain officials bent on unconstitutional usurpations.
Roger Sherman informed New Englanders that "[n]o bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme
power longer than the honey moon of a new married couple, unless the rulers were interested in
preserving the rights."29 Federalist 48 commented, "a mere demarcation on parchment of the
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constitutional departments is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a
tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hand."30 Rights could not
be defined in ways that adequately identified government oppression. "What signifies a
declaration that `the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved?'" Hamilton asked. "What
is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost
latitude for evasion."31 Parchment declarations could also be rescinded. "Neither would a
general declaration of rights be any security," Civic Rusticus wrote, "for the sovereign who made
it could repeal it."32
Individual rights were best protected by well designed institutions. "(A)ll observations
founded upon the danger of usurpation," Hamilton wrote, "ought to be referred to the
composition and structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers."33
Prominent proponents of ratification declared that the national government could be vested with
substantial powers because the internal structure of that regime guaranteed that such authority
would not be abused. “(T)he delegating of power to a government in which the people have so
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many checks,” James Bowdoin Dalton asserted, “will be perfectly safe, and consistent with the
preservation of their liberties.”34 When Madison at the drafting convention emphasized the need
to "introduce the checks . . . for the safety of a minority in danger of oppression from an unjust
and interest majority," he proposed such procedures as a national veto on state legislation rather
than specific limits on government power.35 Hamilton regarded "[t]he Constitution" as "A BILL
OF RIGHTS" in part because it "specif[ied] the political privileges of the citizens in the structure
and administration of the government."36
Basic republican institutions provided the most important structural protection against
tyranny. Officials "dependent on the suffrage of the people for their appointment to, and
continuance in office," were thought "a much greater security than a declaration of rights, or
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restraining clauses upon paper."37 The "security" for rights, Hamilton bluntly stated, "whatever
fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on
public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government."38 Benjamin Rush
informed Pennsylvanians that "there is no security but in a pure and adequate representation."39
George Mason agreed that “the democratic principle . . . was the only security for the rights of
the people.”40
When considering the processes for staffing the national government and making laws,
the framers consistently selected those republican practices they believed would best protect
fundamental freedoms. The constitution established relatively large election districts and
relatively long terms of office because the framers thought these practices would "obtain for
rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of
society."41 The Senate was similarly structured to privilege the selection of “men of integrity
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and abilities.”42 Such persons because of their superior political fibre would tend to exercise
power prudently, protect fundamental freedoms, respect constitutional compromises, and
generally adhere to the spirit of the constitution. Madison thought religious freedom would be
protected primarily by electoral arrangements that ensured the diversity necessary to prevent any
sect or combination of sects from establishing the control over the national legislature necessary
to oppress rival sects. He famously declared, "in the extended republic of the United States, and
among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a
majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principle than those of justice
and the general good."
The constitutional provisions crafted in 1787 are better conceptualized as guidelines for
elected officials than as poorly drafted or intentionally vague legal rules to be enforced by the
federal judiciary. The constitution of 1787 does contain some legal rules. The American
constitution requires congressional elections to be held every two years and insists that war be
declared only by the national legislature. These rules, however, are not the most important
source of limits on government powers. Rather than specify fundamental freedoms and vital
interests in advance and for all time, the framers designed institutions that let states, government
officers, various religious sects, and other entities at any given time determine and protect their
rights. Whether governing institutions are functioning as originally designed depends on the
extent to which the officers making decisions have the requisite abilities and interests, and not on
the precise decisions they make. Herbert Storing’s influential analysis of framing thought aptly
concluded that "the substance [of the constitution] is a design of government with powers to act
42
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and a structure arranged to make it act wisely and responsibly." "It is in that design, not in its
preamble or its epilogue," he emphasized, "that the security of American civil and political
liberties lie."43

B. The Rights Protected in 1787

Institutional strategies for protecting natural and civic rights were particularly appropriate
given the nature of the liberties Americans sought to secure in 1787. Constitutional institutions
were expected to secure fundamental rights, and not simply those rights thought to be
fundamental during the late eighteenth century. Many fundamental rights were conceptualized
as rights against partial or class legislation, laws intended to benefit or enrich some persons at the
expense of others. The framers thought official measures aimed at the common good did not
violate liberty, no matter what the constraint on individual action. Governing officials were even
authorized to waive the rights of their constituents when doing so was clearly in the public
interest. Characterizing rights in this way, the persons responsible for the constitution sought to
craft rules for staffing the national government and making national laws that would motivate
voters and governing officials to pursue the general welfare. They rejected fixed legal
limitations on government power that might in the future prove inconsistent with the common
43
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good.
The framers recognized that enumeration was a poor vehicle for securing the full panoply
of fundamental rights. Listing the freedoms considered fundamental in 1787 was impossible.
“[A]n enumeration which is not complete is not safe,” James Madison informed the Virginia
Ratification Convention, and “[s]uch an enumeration could not be made, within any compass of
time.”44 James Iredell asserted that the effort “to enumerate a number of rights which are not
intended to be given up” was “dangerous.”
[I]t would be implying, in the strongest manner, that every right not included in
this exception might be impaired by the government without usurpation; and it
would be impossible to enumerate every one. Let any one make what collection
or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty
more rights not contained in it.45
Present enumerations risked disparaging rights recognized by future generations.46 The framers
believed that their descendants might better understand fundamental freedoms than they. “[T]he
law of nature,” James Wilson declared, “though immutable in its principles, will be progressive
in its operations and effects.” In his view, “the law, which the divine wisdom has approved for
44
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man, will not only be fitted, to the contemporary degree but will be calculated to produce, in
future, a still higher degree of perfection.”47 Federalists worried that textual guarantees for
presently acknowledged liberties might inhibit protection for liberties acknowledged in the
future. Edmund Pendleton thought proposed bills of rights failed to anticipate that "in the
progress of things, [we may] discover some great and Important [right], which we don't now
think of."48
Well designed governing institutions were better means for protecting all the fundamental
rights Americans recognized in 1787 and might recognize in the future. When the federal
government was functioning as the framers expected, governing officials would not violate
whatever fundamental rights most Americans believed they had because all governing officials
were elected by the people or appointed by officials elected by the people. “Frequent elections
of the representatives of the people,” John Dickinson stated, “are the sovereign remedy of all
grievances in a free government.”49 These governing officials were likely to make wise
decisions when future disputes over fundamental rights arose because they were selected by a
process thought to guarantee as distinguished a class of governing officials as republicanly
47
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possible.50 “The danger in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress the minority” will “be
guarded against,” Madison maintained when discussing the Senate, “by the establishment of a
body in the Govt. sufficiently respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergencies,
the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into that scale.”51 As Americans gained
greater knowledge of their fundamental rights, prominent framers were confident that institutions
staffed by virtuous governing officials could be trusted to respect those newly acknowledged
liberties.
Many fundamental liberties the framers sought to protect were rights against legislation
directed at particular persons or classes. Antebellum Americans did not regard laws aimed at
safeguarding the public welfare, health, safety or morals as violating fundamental rights.52 In
their view, government officials did not limit liberty when they forbade actions thought to
threaten harm to others or self. The emphasis was on legislative ends, not on legislative means.
As Howard Gillman perceptively notes, pre-New Deal “jurisprudence . . . focused on the
character of the legislation rather than the importance of the restricted liberty (emphasis in
original).”53 Justice Stephen Field articulated this consensual view when asserting that “[c]lass
50
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legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which,
in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation
it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not [prohibited by the fourteenth] amendment.”54
The Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York articulated this consensus when holding that states
could not restrict the hours that bakers worked. Such measures benefitted employees at the
expense of employers and “involve[d] neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the
public.”55 Antebellum Americans similarly yoked the freedom to possess and carry weapons to
the public good. As originally understood, the Second Amendment protected “a civic right that
guaranteed that citizens would be able to keep and bear those arms needed to meet their legal
obligation to participate in a well-regulated militia.” Such a conception of liberty, Saul Cornell
documents, was quite consistent with any “intrusive gun regulation” thought necessary to serve
the commonweal.56 Committed to this distinction between public and private purposes,
Americans before the New Deal regarded laws transferring property from one person to another
as the paradigmatic violation of a fundamental right,57 but thought government could take
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property from anyone for public purposes as long as compensation was paid.58 Common law in
the nineteenth century permitted state officials to destroy the value of private property without
compensation when that property in its natural state or as used was causing harm to others.59
Well designed governing institutions best secured this fundamental right not to be a
victim of private or class legislation. What was crucial, Federalists insisted, was that
government pursue the common good, not that government pursue the common good by means
that did not interfere with individual autonomy. The eighteenth century constitution protected
this notion of fundamental right by establishing government arrangements that thought to
provide citizens and elected officials with incentives to promote the general welfare.60 The
framers believed the combination of elections, large electoral districts, and the separation of
powers would maximize the probability that all legislation had a public purpose. Federalist 10
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declared that by “extend[ing] the sphere” of constitutional politics, “you will make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”
“The genius of the system,” Federalist 57 maintained, was that governing officials could “make
no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the
great mass of society.”61 If this analysis was correct, then a Bill of Rights was not necessary.
Government officials could benefit themselves and their friends only by pursuing the general
welfare. Should malfunctioning constitutional institutions enable governing officials to enrich
themselves at the expense of others, prohibitions on paper would not provide an adequate
deterrent. The framers saw “history” as “prov[ing] that no formal constraints on authority or
process could constrain indefinitely the power of a political leader who did not depend on other
political actors.”62 “The sole question,” Sherman insisted, “ought to be, how are Congress
formed? How far are the members interested to preserve your rights?”63
Conceptualizing tyranny as rule dedicated to private interests, members of the framing
generation believed that the people’s representatives could waive fundamental rights of their
constituents when doing so promoted social ends. Private property rights, in particular, were
subject to legislative waiver when the public welfare required all individuals to make common
sacrifices. Government could take private property by taxation, but only when given permission
by electorally accountable officials who could be trusted to exercise taxing and spending powers
only in the public interest. “Taxation of the subject,” Grey details, “required consent–at least in
61
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the . . . sense that it required approval by a body in which the subject was represented.”64 The
people through their elected representatives determined what portion of their private property
would be dedicated to the public good. Daniel Dulany regarded this right of “self-taxation” to be
“an essential principle of the English constitution.”65 “It is an essential unalterable right in
nature,” Samuel Adams asserted,
ingrafted into the British Constitution, as a fundamental Law and ever held sacred
and irrevocable by the Subjects within the Realm, that what a man has honestly
acquired is absolutely his own, which he may freely give, but cannot be taken
from him without his consent.66
Taxation with representation reflected a communal decision to abandon certain claims of
individual right. Taxation without representation was theft.
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Properly designed governing arrangements were better vehicles that parchment
guarantees for realizing the eighteenth century understanding of taxation as voluntary donation.
Individuals had no right against any tax on any item in any amount. Whether a tax violated
property rights depended on the nature of the institution doing the taxing, the nature of the tax
imposed, and the purposes for which that revenue might be used. The people’s representatives
could tax whatever they pleased however much they pleased, as long as the tax was general and
the revenue directed toward public purposes. Property rights were protected in this regime by
governing institutions designed to ensure that taxation burdens were fair and no more than
necessary to secure public purposes, not by paper rules limiting the means by which the state
could obtain needed revenues.

II. Toward Enumeration

The participants in the constitutional convention sought to design institutions that would
be controlled by persons capable of exercising power wisely and respecting fundamental
freedoms. With rare exceptions, debate was limited to the structure of the national government.
Once agreement was reached on the composition of the national legislature, agreement on
national powers was achieved fairly easily. "From the day when every doubt of the right of the
smaller states to an equal vote in the senate was quieted," Madison remembered, "they . . .
exceeded all others in zeal for granting powers to the general government."67 Responsibility for
67
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the precise delineation of federal powers was given to the aptly named "Committee on Detail."
Little debate took place after that committee chose to enumerate specific federal powers rather
than retain the Virginia Plan’s proviso that the federal government be authorized “to legislate in
all cases to which the separate States are incompetent.”68 Three delegates aside, no one worried
about the absence of a bill of rights.69 What mattered were the rules for staffing the national
government and the rules for making national laws, not legal limitations on national power.
These constitutional understandings changed between 1787 and 1791. The debate over
the Bill of Rights led many leading proponents of ratification to place greater emphasis than they
had at the Philadelphia convention on enumerated powers as a legal protection for fundamental
rights. Madison and other prominent framers also promised amendments enumerating rights in
order to assure ratification in New York, Massachusetts and Virginia. Prominent Federalists,
however, continued insisting that fundamental freedoms were better protected by the structure of
constitutional politics than by rules of constitutional law. The paucity of debate over the shift to
enumerated powers combined with the mixed motives Federalists had for championing
enumerated rights left unclear whether this increased reliance on enumeration changed the nature
of constitutional protections for fundamental rights.

“Madison’s Audience,” pp. 621-22, 643; Rakove, Original Meanings, pp. 63-65.
68

See John C. Hueston, “Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention: The Role

of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Federal Powers,” 100 Yale
Law Journal 765, 779 (1990).
69

See Farrand, 2 Records, pp. 587-88; 13 Documentary History, p. 348.

26
A. Toward Enumerated Powers

Whether many delegates thought basic constitutional principles were affected when the
Committee on Detail provided a specific enumeration of national powers is doubtful.70 The
Committee on Detail was instructed to transform a series of resolutions into a constitution. One
of those resolutions, proposed by Gunning Bedford of Delaware, asserted that the national
government should be vested with the power “to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of
the Union.”71 Committee members were not authorized to deviate from these sentiments.
George Washington asserted that the committee was “to arrange, and draw into method & form
the several matters which had been agreed to by the Convention.”72 No debate on the merits of
enumeration took place after the Committee on Detail replaced the general language of
Bedford’s Resolution with an enumeration of powers augmented by the necessary and proper
clause,73 even though the framers had previously regarded enumeration as unnecessary.74 Some
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members of the convention, most notably Pierce Butler of South Carolina, did hope that the
broad language of the Virginia Plan would eventually be replaced by a particular specification.75
Nevertheless, no member of the ratifying convention who championed federal power perceived a
substantial difference between the enumerated powers listed by the Committee of Detail and the
original proposal to vest the national government with the authority to regulate all national
concerns. Had the committee “meant to disregard the proposal to confer on Congress the power
to legislate in the general interests of the United States,” Joseph Lynch observes, “we should
expect to read of a discontented Bedford protesting the committee’s betrayal of his handiwork,
and of a happy Butler76 supporting the report. That . . . was not the case.”77
Federalist rhetoric during the ratification debates further indicates that few notables
thought the Committee on Detail had altered the original constitutional design. Proponents of
ratification in 1787 and 1788 indiscriminately combined assertions that federal powers were
limited with assertions that Congress was authorized to regulate all matters of national
importance. Federalist 39 insisted that federal “jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated
objects only.”78 “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government,” Publius later stated, “are few and defined.”79 Other papers scorned efforts to place
legal limits on national power. Federalist 31 declared that as a general rule "there ought to be no
75
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limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation."80
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 23 wrote that the powers "essential to the common defense
ought to exist without limitation because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may
be necessary to satisfy them."81 Hamilton added that "a complete power . . . to procure a regular
and adequate supply of revenue," as well as an absolute power "to borrow as far as necessities
might require" were vital to the constitution.82 Enumeration, these passages suggest, restricted
the ends the national government could constitutionally pursue, but not the means by which the
national government could pursue constitutional ends.
Many Federalists during the ratification debates disparaged enumerated powers. "Is it,
indeed, possible," Jasper Yeates challenged the members of the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, "to define any power so accurately, that it shall reach the particular object for which
it was given, and yet not be liable to perversion and abuse?"83 When Federalists spoke about
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federal authority, they consistently asserted that the federal government had the power to meet
all national concerns. John Jay described the constitution as forming a “national government,
competent to every national object.”84
Few Federalists thought seriously about the legal significance of enumerated powers
because they still preferred constitutional politics to constitutional law as the best means for
restraining national officials. Proponents of ratification consistently emphasized how national
electoral institutions were structured to guarantee that the vast majority of oppressive proposals
would not become the law of the land.85 Federalism was safeguarded by government institutions
designed to ensure that all national decisions were made by officials dependent for their offices
on local governments or on a local electorate, not by judicial review. “The construction of the
Senate,” Tench Coxe asserted, “affords an absolute certainty, that the states will not lose their
present share of separate powers.”86 The federal judiciary, by comparison, was primarily
84
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responsible for ensuring that states respected constitutional mandates.87 Federal justices were
authorized to declare federal laws unconstitutional, but were expected to use that power
sparingly. Rakove observes that while "the framers intended judicial review to apply to the
realm of national legislation. . . ., (t)heir decisions on the structure of the national government
gave the framers little reason to worry that Congress would enact or the president approve
constitutionally improper statutes that the federal judiciary would feel compelled to overturn."88
The general understanding that elected officials, with the approval of their constituents
could waive legal limits on their power when an “ultra vires” action was clearly in the public
good, further diminished the practical difference between a government of enumerated powers
and one “competent to every national object.” Jefferson claimed such extra-constitutional
authority to act in the national interest when authorizing the Louisiana Purchase.89 John
Nicholas in 1794 informed Congress that while “he had not been able to discover upon what
authority the House” had “to grant” money to French refugees,
he had resolved to give his voice in favor of the sufferers; but when he returned to
his constituents, he would honestly tell them that he would consider himself as
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having exceeded his powers, and so cast himself on their mercy.90
The long run functioning of the constitutional system in which representatives and executives
could plausibly assert this power to transgress constitutional limitations depended on the people
having the capacity to elect governing officials with the requisite combination of abilities and
interests, not on the legal maintenance of well defined enumerated powers.

B. Enumerated Powers and Unenumerated Rights

The decision to enumerate powers did have the unexpected consequence of enabling
proponents of ratification to propose a more legal supplement to the original institutional strategy
for protecting basic rights. Although no evidence suggests that the Committee on Detail was
very concerned with such matters as the freedom of speech and religious liberty, prominent
framers when responding to anti-Federalist demands for a bill of rights quickly transformed
enumerated powers into a strategy for guaranteeing fundamental liberties. Led by James Wilson,
Federalists during the ratification process insisted that the constitution of 1787 protected
fundamental rights by authorizing the federal government to act only in a few defined
circumstances. Enumerating powers, they insisted, made enumerating rights unnecessary.
Wilson famously claimed that "(c)onstitutional authority is to be collected . . . from positive
grant expressed in the instrument of the union." “Everything which is not given,” he concluded,
“is reserved."91 Anti-Federalists were wrong to insist on provisions asserting a right to free
90
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speech because no constitutional provision permitted Congress to regulate expression. "If I have
one thousand acres of land, and I grant five hundred acres of it," George Nicholas asked, "must I
declare that I retain the other five hundred?"92 Of course, government might impose some
restrictions on advocacy when doing so was necessary to secure such constitutional ends as
national security. Such restraints, however, did not violate fundamental rights as fundamental
rights were understood in 1787. No one was thought to have a right to threaten national security
or otherwise cause harm. Fundamental rights were primarily rights against partial or class
legislation.93 By strictly enumerating government powers, the framers detailed what constituted
the public good and ruled out numerous illegitimate justifications for violating fundamental
rights.
Anti-Federalists rejected these claims that enumerated powers provided adequate
protections for unenumerated rights. They feared that the enumerated powers in Article I were
so vaguely worded that political actors could easily pass off rights violations as efforts to secure
national interests. “Who can overrule the[] pretensions” of Congress that any particular “law is
92
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necessary and proper,” “Old Whig” asked. “No one, unless we had a bill of rights to which we
might appeal, and under which we might contend against any assumption of undue power.”94
Moreover, and more important, anti-Federalists feared that the national government was likely to
be staffed by elites prone to violate the liberties of more ordinary persons.95 Hence, prominent
anti-Federalists combined calls for enumerating rights with calls for changes in the structure of
the national government that would privilege the elected of national officials less inclined to
violate fundamental freedoms. “If there ever was a case for an explicit reservation of individual
rights,” opponents of ratification believed, “the proposed constitution provided one, with its very
extensive powers, its shadow of genuine representation, and its weak and dubious checks on the
encroachments of the few.”96 As concerned with the structure of the national government as
with the lack of a bill of rights, the fundamental anti-Federalist challenge to the constitution was
more directed at the original institutional strategy for protecting fundamental freedoms than to
the legal addendum jerryrigged during the ratification process.
Madison responded to these Anti-Federalist concerns by severing their legal analysis
from their more vital political analysis. He and his political allies were more than willing, after
the constitution was ratified, to enumerate some fundamental rights if that would appease more
moderate opponents of ratification. That enumeration, however, was justified only as a
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supplement to the more fundamental institutional protections for basic liberties. Madison was
unwilling to make any constitutional change that might affect what he believed were the best
governing arrangements for protecting rights. By consciously adding some constitutional law
without consciously changing the underlying constitutional politics, Madison inadvertently laid
the ground for the contemporary distinction between enumerated and unenumerated rights.
III. The View From 1791

The persons responsible for the Bill of Rights regarded enumeration as a minor
supplement to the institutional strategies crafted in 1787 for protecting fundamental liberties.
When commenting on Madison’s proposed constitutional amendments, prominent framers were
most likely to praise their tendency to alleviate anti-Federalist fears without vitiating Federalist
principles. This desire to pacify political opponents better explains what liberties were specified
by the Bill of Rights than founding beliefs that the rights enumerated were more fundamental
than the rights not explicitly mentioned. Proponents of the Bill of Rights, thinking that welldesigned governing institutions best secured fundamental freedoms, expressed little concern
when confronted with claims that many enumerated rights were too vague to have clear legal
meanings. Madison and his political allies, however, responded aggressively and decisively
when former Anti-Federalists proposed amendments that would alter what Federalists believed
were governing arrangements particularly conducive to protecting fundamental freedoms.

A. Why Enumerate?

35
James Madison in his less than moving speech introducing the Bill of Rights proclaimed
that enumerating rights in a constitution “was neither improper nor altogether useless.”97
Enumeration might foster public support for fundamental freedoms. Constitutional provisions
protecting various liberties, Madison declared, “have a tendency to impress some degree of
respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the
whole community.”98 Local officials would find constitutional declarations of rights useful
when they sought to restrain the national power. Madison stated, “such a declaration in the
federal system would be inforced; because the state legislatures will jealously and closely watch
the operations of this government.”99 Enumerated rights would enable the federal judiciary to
protect the people’s liberties. “If” individual rights provisions “are incorporated into the
Constitution,” Madison informed the first Congress, “independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights.”100
Madison’s proposed Bill of Rights, with the exception of several provisions later
rejected,101 was not designed to add rights to those that the original Constitution was expected to
protect. The problem with the constitution, he believed, was the perception that “it did not
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contain effectual provisions against encroachments on particular rights” (emphasis added).102
Enumeration provided that additional security. As Madison asserted, “it is possible the abuse of
the powers of the general government may be guarded against in a more secure manner that is
now done.”103 His goal was to “fortify the rights of the people against encroachments by the
Government.”104 A textual ban on general warrants, for example, by plainly stating in the
constitutional text that such practices were not legitimate means for pursuing constitutional ends
might prevent the passage of oppressive laws that Madison believed under the unamended
constitution were “neither necessary nor proper.”105

B. Enumeration From the Perspective of 1787

The leading proponents of the federal constitution in the first Congress wanted a Bill of
Rights that would alleviate public anxieties about fundamental rights while maintaining intact the
constitutional politics envisioned in 1787. Tench Coxe urged his political allies to propose
amendments that would enable them to “gain strength & respectability without impairing one
essential power of the constitution.”106 Other Federalists endorsed similar conciliatory and
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preservationist goals when urging constitutional reform. Paine Wingate informed Timothy
Pickering that proposed amendments might “quiet the fears & jealousies of the well designing &
not affect the essentials of the system.”107 Benjamin Hawkins urged James Madison to “do
something by way of amendments without any material injury to the system.”108
Madison’s proposed Bill of Rights was aimed at simultaneously appeasing antiFederalists and preserving Federalist institutions. His plan, Madison told Jefferson, was to
provide those “alterations most called for by the opponents of the Government and least
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objectionable to its friends.”109 Madison informed Samuel Johnston that what became the Bill of
Rights “aims at the twofold object of removing the fears of the discontented and of avoiding all
such alterations as would . . . displease the adverse side.”110 Proponents of the Bill of Rights
praised Madison for securing both goals. “[T]he great Principles of the Constitution are
preserved,” Thomas Hartley asserted, “and the Declarations and Explanations will be acceptable
to the People.”111
Many prominent Federalists regarded the Bill of Rights as little more than a meaningless
“sop” to their political opponents.112 Theodore Sedgwick, while opposed in principle to
Madison’s proposed amendments, thought their ratification politically necessary only if the
liberties enumerated were politically sterile. We “must adopt them in every instance,” he
asserted, “in which they will not shackle the operations of the government.”113 George
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Washington approved such efforts to appease the moderate opposition. While he concluded
some amendments were “importantly necessary,” many others were “necessary” only “to quiet
the fears of some respectable characters and well-meaning men.”114 Similar sentiments were
articulated by numerous leading actors in the First Congress. Fisher Ames thought Madison’s
proposals “may do good towards quieting men who attend to sounds only, and may get the
mover some popularity.”115 Enumeration as a strategy for protecting fundamental rights,
however, was silly. Ames believed specifying “[t]he rights of conscience, of bearing arms” and
“[f]reedom of the press” in the constitutional text would “stimulate the stomach as little as hastypudding.”116
Ames’s political allies agreed that the proposed constitutional amendments were largely
symbolic. “[T]he addition of a little Flourish & Dressing without injuring the substantial part or
adding much to its intrinsic value,” Samuel Johnston wrote, “may have a happy effect in
complimenting the Judgment of those who have themselves up in Opposition to [the
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constitution].”117 Roger Sherman observed that Madison’s proposals “will probably be harmless
& Satisfactory to those who are fond of Bills of Rights.”118 Abraham Baldwin thought that
Madison was trying to “tranquillize the minds of honest opposers without injuring the
system.”119 The Bill of Rights, Edmund Randolph concurred, was “an anodyne to the
discontented.”120 Some crucial “discontented” were political leaders in the two states that in the
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summer of 1789 had not yet ratified the new constitutional regime. Benjamin Goodhue when
celebrating the “probability of giving quiet by so cheap a purchase”121 hoped that meaningless
amendments would “give general satisfaction and accelerate the adoption of the Constitution by
the States of N. Carolina and R. Island.”122
William L. Smith, the rare Federalist member of the First Congress who thought a Bill of
Rights provided vital constitutional restrictions on national power, nevertheless regarded
enumeration as a secondary means for securing fundamental freedoms and was far more
concerned with gaining additional legal protections for southern interests than with providing
better guarantees for basic human rights. As did northern Federalists, Smith favored
amendments that would “more effectually secure private rights, without affecting the structure of
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the Govt.”123 Slavery, however, was the “private right” Smith sought to “more effectually
secure.” The South Carolina Federalist supported a constitutional declaration that “the
enumeration of certain rights shall not be so construed as to deny others retained by the people”
because he believed that amendment “will go a great way in preventing Congress from
interfering with our negroes after 20 years or prohibiting the importation of them.”124 Smith’s
claim that the amended constitution provided stronger protections for slaveholding rights was the
only contemporaneous construction by a national official in 1789 of the liberties originally
thought to be better secured by the Ninth Amendment.
The Federalist concern with appeasing their political opponents dictated the liberties
specified in the Bill of Rights. Madison repeatedly asserted that the proposed amendments
should be limited to those that were sufficiently uncontroversial as to guarantee passage. The
particular freedoms he proposed enumerating, Madison asserted, would “reconcile” the
“discon[ten]ted part of our fellow Citizens . . . to the Government they have opposed . . . by
means as little as possible unacceptable to those who approve the Constitution.” Controversial
proposals were rejected simply because they were controversial. Madison sought to “avoid[] all
controvertible points which might endanger the assent of 2/3 of each branch of Congs. and 3/4 of
the State Legislatures.”125 Amendments submitted by state legislatures were included where
possible because “the principle design of the[] amendments was to conciliate the minds of the
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people” and not to list the most important rights of American citizens.126 Madison proposed
enumerating the freedom of religion because that “had been required by some of the state
conventions,” not because of any virtue inherent in enumerating that right. “[W]hether the words
were necessary or not,” he “did not mean to say.”127 Madison favored an amendment limiting
federal appellate jurisdiction over state courts to cases worth more than one thousand dollars,
even though he thought there was “little danger that any court in the United States will admit an
appeal where the matter in dispute does not amount to a thousand dollars.” Enumeration was
politically valuable because “the possibility of such an event has excited in the minds of many
citizens the greatest apprehension that persons of opulence would carry a cause from the
extremities of the union to the supreme court.”128 Other Federalists urged their colleagues to
support whatever liberties would conciliate former Anti-Federalists, no matter how fundamental
or trivial they regarded the right in question. John Vining tolerated the decision to insert a right
of assembly in the constitution because “the thing was harmless, and . . . would tend to gratify
the states that had proposed amendments.”129 Thomas Hartley would “gratify” all state requests
for specific constitutional provisions as long as the amendment “was not incompatible with the
general good.”130
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No proponent of the Bill of Rights asserted that the rights enumerated by Madison’s
proposed amendments were more important than the rights not enumerated. When Theodore
Sedgwick suggested that the right to assembly was to “trifl[ing] to be inserted” into “a
declaration of rights,”131 most representatives responded that such a provision had been
demanded by the states and was unlikely to cause trouble.132 Few claimed the right fundamental.
John Page’s assertion that “inserting the privilege [of assembly] in a declaration of rights” was
necessary because “such rights have been opposed”133 was the only recorded comment from the
House debate in which a speaker explained why enumeration might be a particularly good means
for protecting some freedoms rather than others. Madison may have hoped that enumerating
restrictions on state power to violate certain fundamental rights would better secure various
liberties against local violations. That proposal, however, was defeated.134
The conciliatory concerns that motivated Federalists to frame the Bill of Rights and their
underlying commitment to securing fundamental rights through well-designed governing
institutions explains why the political leadership of the First Congress ignored occasional
assertions that proposed amendments lacked clear legal meanings. Many Federalists in 1787 had
opposed a Bill of Rights in part because they insisted parchment declarations could not resolve
disputes over the scope of the rights declared. James Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention stated, “[t]he cases open to a jury, differed in the different states; it was therefore
131
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impracticable, on that ground, to have made a general rule.”135 These concerns with vagueness
and ambiguity were repeated during the debates over the Bill of Rights without having any
visible influence on the status of the proposed amendments. Samuel Livermore thought what
became the Eight Amendment had “no meaning in it.” “What is meant by the terms excessive
bail,” he asked. “What is understood by excessive fines?”136 Immediately after that speech, the
House of Representatives approved the proposed amendment by a large margin.137 James
Madison confessed that the right to a jury trial remained contested despite the Sixth Amendment.
“The truth,” he told Edmund Pendleton, “is that in most of the States the practice is different and
hence the irreconcilable difference of ideas on the subject.”138 This “truth” that enumeration
failed to settle ongoing legal disputes over what constituted a proper jury trial apparently did not
even delay the decision to send the proposed amendment mandating jury trials to the states.
Federalists who thought political protections fundamental and enumeration a means of
conciliating political rivals did not consider at any length whether the particular language
135
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Madison employed when enumerating rights encompassed particular practices. Rare questions
about the scope of proposed constitutional provisions were brushed aside without resolution. No
representative responded when Egbert Benson expressed concern that proposed constitutional
protections for religious freedoms might be interpreted as requiring exemptions for those with
religious scruples against engaging in military combat.139 “[A]n enumeration of simple,
acknowledged principles”140 adequately served Federalist political needs. Madison and his
political allies had no political reason to resolve ongoing controversies about the best application
of those principles.
Contemporary efforts to uncover the original meaning of liberties secured by the Bill of
Rights are, thus, largely futile because Federalists in 1789 consciously enumerated general
principles whose practical applications they knew were contestable. Madison understood
that the constitutional meaning of “free exercise,” “an impartial jury,” and other matters left
legally undecided in 1787 and 1791 would be settled by “a series of [subsequent] discussions and
adjudications.”141 Constitutional politics, not constitutional law, remained the primary line of
defense against abusive official actions. Fundamental freedoms would be secure, Federalists
thought, as long as constitutional processes yielded governing officials who had the combination
of abilities and interests necessary to recognize the fundamental liberties of their fellow citizens
and to act on that judgment.
Prominent supporters of the Bill of Rights expressed concern with substantive issues only
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when Anti-Federalists proposed amendments aimed at adjusting the constitutional politics
Federalists thought would best protect fundamental rights. Federalist willingness to
accommodate their political opponents came to an abrupt halt when Thomas Tudor Tucker
moved that the House of Representatives add “to instruct their representatives” to what became
the first amendment.142 Critics of the original constitution regarded such a right as central to a
popular regime. “Instruction and representation in a republic,” John Page declared, “appear to
me to be inseparably connected.”143 Elbridge Gerry regarded “[i]nstructions from the people” as
“an additional check against abuses.”144 The leading proponents of the Bill of Rights vigorously
rejected this effort to change the nature of constitutional representation. George Clymer
declared, “independent and deliberative bod[ies]” were “essential requisites in the legislatures of
free governments.”145 Hartley regarded instructions as a tool of faction, the greatest perceived
threat to freedom in the late eighteenth century. “When the passions of the people were excited,”
he stated, “instructions have been resorted to and obtained, to answer party purposes.”146
Federalists during the debate over instructions consistently proclaimed that fundamental
freedoms were best protected by a national, republican aristocracy.147 Sedgwick insisted that
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congressmen were "representatives of the great body of the people," of "the whole nation." If
national legislators began regarding themselves as representing a particular state or district, he
stated, "the greatest security the people have for their rights and privileges is destroyed."148
Other representatives emphasized how instructions substituted parochial visions for the
deliberation about the public welfare Federalists thought essential to protecting rights. "The
great end of meeting," Hartley asserted, "was to consult for the common good." In his view, the
more "local or partial view" that was “likely to underlie instructions, does not enable any man to
comprehend it."149 Sherman condemned instructions for interfering with the "duty of a good
representative to enquire what measures are most likely to promote the general welfare."150
These comments expressed two core Federalist commitments: legislation aimed at the common
good did not violate fundamental rights151 and that the best way to secure the common good was
to develop an electoral system that enabled particularly virtuous persons to deliberate about the
general welfare.152 Instructions threatened rights, Clymer thought, because "they prevent men of
abilities and experience from rendering those services to the community that are in their
power."153
Most anti-Federalists complained bitterly that the proposed constitutional amendments
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did not alter what they perceived of as the flawed original institutional protections for
fundamental rights. Gerry declared that Madison’s efforts would only “reconcile those who had
no adequate idea of the essential defects of the Constitution.”154 These defects lay in the
structure of the national government and the powers vested in that government. Richard Henry
Lee and William Grayson remained “apprehensive for Civil Liberty” because the
“impracticability . . . of carrying representation sufficiently near to the people . . . compels a
resort to fear resulting from great force and excessive power in Government.”155 “Some valuable
Rights are indeed declared,” Lee fretted, “but the powers that remain are very sufficient to
render them nugatory at pleasure.”156 Many Anti-Federalists echoed the Federalist critique of
enumeration as symbolic politics. Parchment barriers were meaningless, Patrick Henry
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complained, “(f)or Right without her Power & Might is but a shadow.”157 Lee agreed that “right
without power to protect it, is of little avail.”158 George Mason seems to have been the only
leading Anti-Federalist who “received much Satisfaction from the Amendments to the federal
Constitution.”159 The liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights, most opponents of ratification
concluded, were “mutilated and enfeebled,”160 “good for nothing,”161 and “calculated merely to
amuse, or rather to deceive.”162
The Federalists who sponsored the Bill of Rights were no more excited by enumeration.
Madison complained of “the nauseous project of amendments.”163 His political allies spoke of
“this disagreeable Business,”164 “the unpromising subject of amendments,”165 and “the
wearisome business of amendments.”166 Richard Morris thought the effort a “[w]aste of precious
157
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time.”167 Most were happy that, after sending the proposed amendments to the states, Congress
could finally return to substantive business. William Ellery expressed this common sentiment
when he asserted, “I don’t think the amendments will do any hurt, and they may do some good,
and therefore I don’t consider them as of much importance.”168 “God grant it may have the
effects which are desired,” an exhausted Benjamin Goodhue stated, “and that We may never hear
any more of it.”169

IV. Marbury and Enumeration Triumphant?

A. Enumerated Rights in Action

Americans would soon hear much more of the Bill of Rights, particularly when they paid
more attention to legislative proposals than to judicial decisions. Federalists and Jeffersonians at
the turn of the nineteenth century debated at great length whether the Sedition Act of 1798 was
consistent with the First Amendment and the enumerated powers of the national government.170
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James Madison during the War of 1812 informed Joseph Story that a proposed ban on sedition
was unconstitutional.171 First Amendment protections for freedom of religion were invoked
when presidents considered issuing calls for a day of prayer172 and Congress debated appointing
legislative chaplains.173 Proponents and opponents of slavery before the Civil War debated at
great length whether proposed national restrictions on antislavery advocacy were consistent with
the First Amendment and the enumerated powers of the national government.174 Whether the
first ten amendments limited federal power in the territories was another subject of ongoing
legislative debate in antebellum America.175
Federal justices before the Civil War were slower to invoke the individual rights
enumerated by the first ten amendments to the constitution. The Marshall and Taney Courts
more aggressively limited federal power than is commonly thought.176 The justices when
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restraining the national government, however, tended to base decisions on the unenumerated
right not be divested of private property than on any specific constitutional provision. Chief
Justice Marshall in Polk’s Lessee v. Wendal & Al proclaimed as one of “the great principles of
justice and law” that government could not give title to property that the government did not
own. “[A] grant is absolutely void,” he asserted without pointing to any constitutional text, when
“the state has no title to the thing granted.”177 William L. Smith might have been pleased that the
Supreme Court first invoked the Bill of Rights as a limit on federal power when providing
protections for slavery in Dred Scott v. Sandford, although Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion
relied on the due process clause of the fifth amendment rather than on the ninth amendment.178
Federal justices more frequently cited the Bill of Rights after the Civil War. The
Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth century occasionally invoked the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments when limiting national power.179 Numerous judicial decisions handed down after
1950 asserted that state power to violate fundamental rights was limited by the Bill of Rights as
incorporated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.180 Fulfilling a Madisonian
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hope thwarted in 1789,181 the Stone, Vinson, and Warren Courts aggressively protected
fundamental freedoms against hostile state action, while rarely finding that the federal
government had violated the rights enumerated in the first ten amendments.182 The Burger and
Rehnquist Courts were the first tribunals in American history that with some frequency ruled that
federal laws violated the expression rights enumerated by the Constitution.183 The Supreme
Court has never held that a federal law violates either the free exercise or establishment clauses
of the First Amendment.

B. The Logic of Enumeration

The contemporary debate over unenumerated rights is more rooted in the logic of
Marbury v, Madison than in the constitutional strategies for protecting fundamental freedoms
employed by the persons responsible for the original constitution and the Bill of Rights. The
rights specified in the first ten amendments were originally understood merely as examples of the
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individual liberties that the constitution would protect when governing institutions were
functioning as the framers anticipated. Enumerated rights were no more constitutionally
fundamental than those rights not enumerated.184 Several framers asserted that enumeration
facilitated judicial protection for the specified rights,185 but justices before 1787 and until the
Civil War protected both enumerated and unenumerated liberties.186 No evidence exists that the
proponents of the Bill of Rights sought to alter this ongoing judicial practice. John Marshall in
1803, however, proffered a very different conception of the constitutional strategies for limiting
government than those adopted by the framers. Marbury asserted that the constitution limited
government power primarily through written legal restrictions on legislative authority that were
enforceable by a court of law. Marshall’s Marbury opinion was the first major American state
paper that privileged enumeration as the means for securing fundamental freedoms.
Marbury‘s emphasis on the writtenness of the constitution and the constitution as
fundamental law began the process by which legal restrictions on federal power enforced by the
federal judiciary became understood as the primary constitutional strategy for protecting
individual rights and limiting official authority. Constitutions restricted government, Marshall
asserted, by enumerating specific restrictions on government power. “The powers of the
184
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legislature are defined, and limited,” Marbury declared, and “that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”187 In this altered constitutional universe,
writing and only writing restrained government and prevented tyranny by providing legal
grounds for courts to disregard unconstitutional laws. Written constitutional provisions were
“the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,”188 and it was “emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”189
The only constitutional limits on national power this textualist logic recognized were
those enumerated in the original constitution and subsequent amendments. When providing
examples of appropriate exercises of judicial power, Marshall emphasized laws inconsistent with
such textual provisions as the declaration in Article I, Section 9 that “no bill of attainder or ex
post facto law shall be passed.”190 At no point did Marbury suggest that the constitution might
have been designed to protect fundamental freedoms other than those enumerated or that the
framers may have relied on alternative constitutional strategies for limiting government.
Constitutional strategies for protecting fundamental freedoms that abandoned enumeration in
favor of institutions structured to provide all governing officials with incentives to pursue the
general welfare, Marbury implied, “abolished” the “distinction . . . between a government with
limited and unlimited powers.”191
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Marshall’s claim that all provisions of the constitution had independent legal significance
further privileged enumeration as the constitutional strategy for protecting fundamental rights.
Marbury holds that the congressional power to “make exceptions” to the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court does not license the national legislature to add to that tribunal’s original
jurisdiction. Marshall defended this conclusion by claiming, “[i]t cannot be presumed that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”192 The framers would not have
specifically enumerated the conditions under which the Supreme Court could exercise original
jurisdiction, he maintained, if the “exceptions” clause of Article III empowered Congress to alter
federal jurisdiction at will.193 This presumption that all constitutional provisions are legally
significant implicitly undercuts previous Federalist assertions that the Bill of Rights was largely
declaratory, that the first ten amendments are best understood as merely enumerating examples
of the rights that the original constitution was designed to secure.194 If every constitutional
provision has “[legal] effect,” and only some rights are enumerated, then the inference is near
overwhelming that government officials are constitutionally obligated to respect only those
rights enumerated in the constitutional text. Had the constitution of 1787 protected all
fundamental freedoms, there would have been no reason, by Marshall’s logic, to enumerate only
some liberties in 1791.
Marbury’s teachings did not immediately bear fruit. As several commentators have
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noted, the decision was “born out of political defeat.”195 Judicial power to enforce the
constitution was no greater immediately after 1803 than immediately before. At most, Marbury
preserved whatever judicial power had previously existed.196 Many antebellum judicial
opinions failed to distinguish between enumerated and unenumerated rights.197 The Marshall
Court relied on both natural law and the contracts clause in Fletcher v. Peck.198 Federal justices
as late as 1862 insisted that both federal and state officials were obligated to respect the
“obligation of contract,” even though the constitutional text explicitly limits only state power.
Justice Nathan Clifford in Rice v. Railroad Co. asserted, “if the legal effect of the act of
Congress” at issue “was to grant to the Territory a beneficial interest in the lands [in dispute],
then it is equally clear that it was not competent for Congress to pass the repealing act, and divest
the title.”199 No enumerated right was cited as authority for this proposition. Justice Nelson’s
dissent similarly disdained text as the primary source for fundamental freedoms. After citing
Fletcher for the proposition that “[i]t is well settled in this court that grants [of land], when made
by the Legislature of a State cannot be recalled,” Nelson asserted, “we do not perceive any
reason why the inviolability of the same class of grants should be less when made by the
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legislative power of the General Government.”200
Enumeration became the central constitutional strategy for protecting fundamental rights
only after the Civil War. An alliance of powerful lawyers and Republican party officials
successfully promoted federal courts as the institution primarily responsible for enforcing
constitutional limits on government power.201 Their efforts revived both the Marbury
precedent202 and the textualist logic underlying Marbury. In opinions citing Marbury, late
nineteenth century justices asked, “[o]f what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right
for the security of individual liberty have been written, . . . if their limitations and restraints upon
power may be overpassed with impunity.”203 The first Justice Harlan quoted Marbury at length
when asserting judicial power, declaring, "[t]o what purpose . . . are powers limited, and to what
purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by
those intended to be restrained?”204 When Thomas Cooley in Constitutional Limitations
expressed his “full sympathy with all those restraints which the caution of the fathers had
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imposed upon the exercise of the powers of government,” he was referring to enumerated powers
and enumerated rights, and not to a political process thought to provide governing officials with
sufficient incentives to pursue the general welfare.205 Rights, conservative commentators
insisted, were better secured by legal interpretation than by constitutional politics. The “domain
of individual liberty,” John W. Burgess stated, was “protected by an independent unpolitical
department,”206 and not, as the framers had thought, by political institutions designed to privilege
fundamental freedoms.
During the second half of the twentieth century, a new generation of liberal scholars and
judicial activists articulated the same catechism, although frequently on behalf of a different set
of rights than those previously championed by conservative proponents of judicial power.
Justice Hugo Black, in particular, celebrated judicial protection of enumerated rights as the near
exclusive constitutional strategy for protecting fundamental freedoms. “To hold that this Court
can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what
degree,” he asserted in Adamson v. California, “is to frustrate the great design of a written
Constitution.”207 Black in Reid v. Covert declared, “[t]he rights and liberties which citizens of
our country enjoy are not protected by custom and tradition alone, they have been jealously
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preserved from the encroachments of Government by express provisions of our written
Constitution.”208 The same textualist logic that committed Black to protecting all liberties
enumerated by the written constitution led him to reject vehemently the notion of judicial
protection for unenumerated constitutional rights. His dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut
legitimated judicial power when “courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional
boundaries seek to execute policies written into the Constitution,” but not when “they roam at
will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actually select policies.”209
Two strategies were open for those who rejected Justice Black’s constitutional vision.
The first, championed by Thomas Grey and Suzanna Sherry, insisted that not all fundamental
constitutional freedoms were enumerated. Grey endorsed “the court’s additional role as
expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content
of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution.”210 “The
framers,” Sherry agreed, “intended courts to look outside the Constitution in determining the
validity of certain governmental actions, specifically those affecting the fundamental rights of
individuals.”211 The second, championed by Ronald Dworkin, insisted that what Grey and
Sherry regarded as unenumerated rights were, in fact, legitimate interpretations of such
enumerated rights as due process and equal protection. “The Bill of Rights,” Dworkin has
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claimed, “consists of broad and abstract principles of political morality, which together
encompass, in exceptionally abstract form, all the dimensions of political morality that in our
political culture can ground an individual constitutional right.” In his view, “[t]he key issue in
applying these abstract principles to particular political controversies is not one of reference but
of interpretation, which is very different.”212
Both alternatives disparage the constitution of 1787. Dworkin’s constitution is the
constitution of 1791, a constitution that protects only enumerated rights, however broadly those
enumerated rights are defined. “The right to burn a flag and the right against genderdiscrimination” are constitutional rights, Dworkin asserts, only because they “are supported by
the best interpretation of a more general or abstract right that is ‘mentioned.’”213 Grey and
Sherry’s constitution is the constitution of 1803, a constitution whose limits are expounded
primarily by the federal judiciary. The first paragraph of Grey’s seminal article declares, “the
most fundamental question we can ask about our fundamental law” is what “our judges” should
do.214 Sherry concludes that “[t]he founding generation . . . expected the judiciary to keep
legislatures from transgressing the natural rights of mankind, whether or not those rights found
their way into the written Constitution.”215 Both positions ignore the original commitment to
protecting fundamental rights by a series of well-designed government institutions, one of which,
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but only one of which, is the Supreme Court of the United States.216
The more institutional guarantees for fundamental freedoms underlying the constitution
of 1787 may nevertheless determine what rights Americans enjoy at the turn of the twenty-first
century. Madison understood that the numerous constitutional questions and questions of
constitutional law left undecided by the framers would be resolved by the governing officials
who were selected according the rules laid down by Articles I, II, and III.217 These rules privilege
some constitutional visions at the expense of others, although not necessarily the constitutional
visions the persons responsible for the constitution hoped to privilege. The electoral college and
state equality in the Senate, for example, help explain why the dominant Republican Party
coalition is presently able to champion far more conservative positions than those held by the
fictitious median national voter.218 Howard Gillman correctly points out that the future of
enumerated and unenumerated rights will depend as much on the predilections of this incumbent
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Republican majority as on what was and was not enumerated in 1787, 1791, and 1868.219
Madison would not be troubled knowing that George Bush and his political allies may not
defend those liberties Federalists thought fundamental in 1787. The constitution of 1787 was
structured to incorporate progressive understandings of human flourishing. The real question
from the perspective of 1787 is whether constitutional institutions can still be trusted to generate
a political leadership with the capacity and incentives to pursue the common good and secure
basic human rights.
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